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UPON FURTHER REVIEW: 
RECONSIDERING CLARETT AND 





Maurice Clarett grew up in Youngstown, Ohio, where he  
excelled as a high school football player.1  In 2001, he earned a scholarship to 
play football for the Ohio State University Buckeyes.2  As a freshman, he made 
an immediate impact, leading the Buckeyes to an undefeated 2002 season, 
which included a Fiesta Bowl victory over the defending national champions 
from the University of Miami and a national championship.3 
However, things quickly soured for Clarett.  Late in the 2002 season, Clarett 
suffered a falling out with the Ohio State coaching staff over their refusal to pay 
for his transportation back home to a friend’s funeral.4  Shortly thereafter,  
Clarett faced accusations of academic misconduct stemming from alleged  
preferential treatment that he received in an introductory African-American and 
African studies class.5  Then, before playing a single snap of the 2003 season, 
Clarett encountered legal problems stemming from his alleged falsification of a 
 
* Matthew Strauser is the 2018 National Sports Law Student Writing Competition Award winner.  
Strauser received a B.A. in Politics from Princeton University (2014) and a M.A. in Curriculum and  
Instruction from the University of Mississippi (2016) while in the Mississippi Teacher Corps.  He is a J.D. 
Candidate (2019) at William & Mary Law School.   
1. 30 for 30: Youngstown Boys (ESPN television broadcast Dec. 14, 2013).  
2. Id. 
3. Id. 
4. See William C. Rhoden, Paying the Price While Coaches Cash In, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2007, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/09/sports/ncaafootball/09rhoden.html. 
5. Mike Freeman, COLLEGES; When Values Collide: Clarett Got Unusual Aid in Ohio State Class, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 13, 2003, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/13/sports/colleges-when-values-collide-clarett-got-
unusual-aid-in-ohio-state-class.html. 
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police report.6  Additionally, the National Collegiate Athletic Association 
(NCAA) accused Clarett of receiving improper benefits, namely a new SUV, 
which made him vulnerable to disciplinary action from Ohio State.7  Ultimately, 
those violations caused the University to dismiss Clarett from school.8  
Following his dismissal from Ohio State, Clarett attempted to declare for 
the National Football League (NFL) draft.9  However, Clarett failed to secure 
draft eligibility because the NFL had a rule that declared: 
No player shall be permitted to apply for special eligibility for 
selection in the Draft, or otherwise be eligible for the Draft,  
until three NFL regular seasons have begun and ended  
following either his graduation from high school or graduation 
of the class with which he entered high school, whichever is 
earlier.10 
The NFL first enacted age-eligibility rules, like the three-year rule above, 
in 1925, after Harold “Red” Grange went to play for the Chicago Bears before 
he graduated from the University of Illinois.11  For much of the rule’s existence, 
the NFL required players to wait four football seasons after graduating high 
school to become eligible for the draft.12  After nearly seventy years of strict  
enforcement of the “four-year rule,” the NFL liberalized the age-eligibility rule 
in 1990 to allow more players to declare for the draft after three seasons had 
elapsed since graduating from high school.13  With the change, an increasing 
number of players three seasons removed from their high school graduation  
 
6. Associated Press, Timeline: The Rise and Fall of Maurice Clarett, ESPN (Sept. 18, 2006), 
http://www.espn.com/nfl/news/story?id=2545204. 
7. Alan C. Milstein, The Maurice Clarett Story: A Justice System Failure, 20 ROGER WILLIAMS U.L. 
REV. 216, 219-20 (2015). 
8. Id. at 220; Tim Bielik, Ohio State Football: Looking Back at Maurice Clarett a Decade After Leaving 
OSU, BLEACHER REPORT (July 5, 2013), https://bleacherreport.com/articles/1694318-ohio-state-football-
looking-back-at-maurice-clarett-a-decade-after-leaving-osu. 
9. Id.  
10. Collective Bargaining Agreement Between National Football League and National Football League 
Players Association, at art. 6, section 2(b), https://nflpaweb.blob.core.windows.net/media/Default/PDFs/Ac-
tive%20Players/2011%20CBA%20Updated%20with%20Side%20Letters%20thru%201-5-15.pdf,  
(last visited Dec. 13, 2018) [hereinafter 2011 CBA].  The source is referred to as the “three-year rule.”   
Although the cited text comes from the 2011 CBA, Clarett challenged the same “three-year rule” in his suit.  
11. Marc Edelman & Joseph A. Wacker, Collectively Bargained Age/Education Requirements: A Source 
of Antitrust Risk for Sports Club-Owners or Labor Risk for Players Unions?, 115 PENN ST. L. REV. 341,  
344-46 (2010). 
12. Clarett v. Nat’l Football League, 369 F.3d 124, 126 (2d Cir. 2004).  Indeed, from 1926-1989 the NFL 
granted only two exemptions to the four-year rule: one to nineteen-year-old running back Andy Livingston 
and the other to NFL Hall of Famer Barry Sanders.  Edelman & Wacker, supra note 11, at 346-47. 
13. Edelman & Wacker, supra note 11, at 347-48. 
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entered the NFL draft and excelled in professional football upon their arrival.14  
Moreover, two players only two seasons removed from their high school  
graduations successfully petitioned the NFL for special draft eligibility and had 
highly productive NFL careers.15  Despite these successes, the NFL refused to 
lower their age eligibility requirements any further.16  This left Clarett on the 
outside of the NFL looking in, leading him to challenge the NFL’s three-year 
rule as an unreasonable restraint on trade in violation of federal antitrust law.17  
The NFL argued that the three-year rule did not violate antitrust law because 
the non-statutory labor exemption applied to the rule.18  Unfortunately for  
Clarett, future Supreme Court Justice Sonia Sotomayor, writing for the Second 
Circuit, agreed with the NFL and held that the non-statutory labor exemption to 
federal antitrust law applied to the NFL’s three-year rule.19  The court relied on 
three Second Circuit cases that involved the applicability of the non-statutory 
labor exemption to labor policies in professional basketball to reach its  
holding.20  The analysis in those decisions, and, thus, in Clarett, were “rooted 
in the observation that the relationships among the defendant sports leagues and 
their players were governed by collective bargaining agreements and thus were 
subject to the carefully structured regime established by federal labor laws.”21  
Thus, the analysis in Clarett focused largely on the nature of the relationship 
between Clarett, the National Football League Players Association (NFLPA), 
and the NFL.22  
Applying this framework, the Second Circuit held that the NFLPA  
represented Clarett, making him a party to the bargaining unit that negotiated 
the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) and subjecting him to the CBA’s 
terms, including the three-year rule.23  After being denied the opportunity to 
pursue “the kind of high-paying, high-profile career he desire[d],”24 Clarett 
 
14. Id. at 348-49. 
15. Id. at 349-52. 
16. Id. at 353-54. 
17. Clarett, 369 F.3d at 126. 
18. Memorandum of the National Football League (1) in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary 
Judgment and (2) in Support of the NFL’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (Non-Statutory Labor  
Exemption) at 12-23, Clarett v. Nat’l Football League, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)  
(No. 03-CV-7441), 2003 WL 23220600 [hereinafter Memorandum of the National Football League]. 
19. Clarett, 369 F.3d at 143. 
20. Id. at 134. 
21. Id. at 135. 
22. Id. at 138-43. 
23. Id. 
24. Id. at 141. 
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petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.25  When the 
Supreme Court denied his petition, Clarett’s case, and his dream of playing  
professional football in 2004, died.26 
This Comment reexamines the Second Circuit’s decision in Clarett, but it 
does not propose a new rule for analyzing when the non-statutory labor  
exemption should apply.  Under the Second Circuit’s test, the non-statutory  
labor exemption applies to the three-year rule if the rule results from the  
collective bargaining process between the affected parties.27  This Comment  
argues that, even under that test, the NFL’s three-year rule should face federal 
antitrust scrutiny because the Second Circuit ruling misunderstood the  
relationship between prospective professional football players and the NFLPA 
by treating the NFLPA as the representative of future NFL players.  
This Comment argues that the NFLPA does not represent college football 
players; therefore, college football players and the NFL did not bargain for the 
three-year rule because the bargaining unit that negotiated the NFL CBA did 
not include prospective players.  Thus, even if one assumes that the Second  
Circuit applied the right test for determining the applicability of the  
non-statutory labor exemption in Clarett, the non-statutory labor exemption 
should still not apply and courts should subject the three-year rule to federal 
antitrust law. 
Thus, even applying the Second Circuit’s own pro-NFL test, this Comment 
contends that the court decided Clarett incorrectly.  Before arriving at this  
conclusion, this Comment provides background information on the Sherman 
Act and the non-statutory labor exemption in Part II, particularly focusing on 
the non-statutory labor exemption’s application to labor policy in professional 
sports.  In Part III, this Comment analyzes the Second Circuit’s decision in  
Clarett and how the court determined whether the non-statutory labor  
exemption applied.  In Part IV, this Comment argues that the bargaining unit 
that negotiated the CBA did not include Clarett or any other college football 
player, which should subject the NFL’s three-year rule to federal antitrust law.  
This result likely would lead courts to strike down the NFL’s age eligibility rule 
as an unfair restraint on trade, opening up the professional football labor market 
to all college football players, regardless of the number of seasons that elapsed 
 
25. See Lynn Zinser, PRO FOOTBALL; Clarett Turns to Supreme Court for Help, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 
2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/21/sports/pro-football-clarett-turns-to-supreme-court-for-help.html. 
26. See Judy Battista, Supreme Court Rejects Appeals by Clarett, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2004, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/23/sports/pro-football-supreme-court-rejects-appeals-by-clarett.html. 
27. Clarett, 369 F.3d at 135 (describing how Second Circuit precedent regarding the applicability of the 
non-statutory labor exemption in the professional sports context “was rooted in the observation that the  
relationships among the defendant sports leagues and their players were governed by collective bargaining 
agreements . . . .”). 
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between a player’s final high school season and his declaration for the NFL 
draft.28  Finally, this Comment briefly contemplates a new system for regulating 
player access to the NFL in a post-three-year-rule world. 
II. HISTORY OF THE SHERMAN ACT AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE  
NON-STATUTORY LABOR EXEMPTION 
Congress passed the Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890 against a backdrop of 
growing antitrust and anti-monopoly sentiment that emerged in response to 
problems created by the nearly omnipotent trusts and monopolies that  
dominated business, subjugated workers, and controlled politics during the 
Gilded Age.29  Congress satisfied the public desire for a solution to this problem 
by passing the Sherman Act.30 
The Sherman Act prohibits the “excessive concentration of private  
economic power” via a variety of legal remedies.31  Despite the public’s primary 
concern with the expanding power of corporate monopolies, numerous courts 
focused on how the Sherman Act applied to labor unions, rather than  
corporations, which ultimately led the courts to restrict key union activities in 
the years after the Act’s passage.32 
Union leaders, led by Samuel Gompers, challenged interpretations of the 
Act that prohibited critical pro-labor activity, like unionization and strikes.33  
Pressure by labor leaders, coupled with an adverse Supreme Court decision 
holding that unions violated the Sherman Act,34 led Congress to eventually pass 
the Clayton Antitrust Act.35  
 
28. This Comment assumes that if a court held that the non-statutory labor exemption did not apply, then 
that court would also hold that the NFL’s three-year rule violated federal antitrust law.  For a detailed  
explanation describing why the NFL three-year rule would violate federal antitrust law if the non-statutory 
labor exemption did not apply, see Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 397-411 rev’d in part, vacated in part, 369 
F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 961 (2005) (ruling that Clarett had antitrust standing and that 
the NFL’s three-year rule unreasonably restrained trade in direct violation of the Sherman Act).  The court 
applied the “Rule of Reason” test and found that the age-eligibility rule served as a “naked restraint of trade,” 
that the rule lacked any “legitimate procompetitive justification,” and that “less restrictive alternatives to the 
rule” existed.  Id. at 406-10. 
29. See WILLIAM LETWIN, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA: THE EVOLUTION OF THE SHERMAN 
ANTITRUST ACT 70 (Greenwood Press ed., 1980) (1965). 
30. Id. at 100. 
31. Id. at 16. 
32. Id. at 155-61. 
33. Id. at 248. 
34. See Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908); see also Phillip J. Closius, The Jocks and the Justice: 
How Sotomayor Restrained College Athletes, 26 MARQ. SPORTS. L. REV. 493, 497 (2016) (discussing the 
history of the non-statutory labor exemption). 
35. See LETWIN, supra note 29, at 273-76. 
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The Clayton Act offered numerous concessions to unions, the most  
fundamental of which clarified that antitrust laws did not proscribe labor unions, 
codifying the common law rule “that a labor union did not, merely by existing, 
constitute an illegal combination in restraint of trade.”36 
A subsequent Supreme Court decision—United States v. Hutcheson— 
expanded labor’s power, creating what has been known as the non-statutory la-
bor exemption.37  Hutcheson recognized the exemption as necessary to  
facilitate collective bargaining between employers and labor unions by  
exempting “the types of activities which had become familiar incidents of union 
procedure.”38  The non-statutory labor exemption allowed “some restraints on 
competition imposed through the bargaining process” to promote “meaningful 
collective bargaining.”39  
A. Antitrust Challenges Initiated by Employers 
Despite the non-statutory labor exemption, antitrust challenges to collective 
bargaining agreements between labor unions and employers have arisen when 
such agreements are “alleged to have injured or eliminated a competitor in the 
employer’s business or product market.”40  In Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union 
No. 3, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, the Supreme Court held 
that the non-statutory labor exemption did not apply to an agreement between 
an electrical workers union and contractors that closed the New York City  
market to electrical equipment manufacturers that did not employ union  
workers.41  
Then, in two 1965 cases, the Supreme Court again contemplated the limits 
of the non-statutory labor exemption.42  In United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 
the Court found that the non-statutory labor exemption did not apply to an  
agreement regarding wages between a miners’ union and large mining  
companies because the parties to the agreement meant “to impose a certain wage 
scale on other bargaining units,” namely small coal miners that did not  
participate in negotiations between the miners’ union and large coal  
 
36. Id. at 274. 
37. United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 236-37 (1941). 
38. Id. 
39. Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 237 (1996). 
40. Clarett v. Nat’l Football League, 369 F.3d 124, 131 (2d Cir. 2004).   
41. Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, In’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 325 U.S. 797, 798-800, 808 
(1945). 
42. See United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); see also Local Union No. 189,  
Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965). 
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companies.43  The Court feared that exempting this agreement from antitrust law 
would drive the small coal mining companies from the market because they 
could not afford the high wages that the large companies and union negotiated.44 
However, in Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher 
Workmen v. Jewel Tea Co., the Court found that the non-statutory labor  
exemption applied to an agreement between a butchers’ union and Chicago meat 
suppliers that limited when meat counters could operate.45  Jewel Tea, one of 
the meat suppliers, complained that it signed the agreement because of union 
pressure.46  Yet, Jewel Tea’s challenge failed because it did “not allege that it 
ha[d] been injured by the elimination of competition among the other employers 
within the unit with respect to marketing hours.”47  To arrive at its decision, the 
Court focused on determining whether the hours restriction was “so  
intimately related to wages, hours and working conditions that the unions’  
successful attempt to obtain that provision through bona-fide, arm’s-length  
bargaining in pursuit of their own labor union policies” subjected the  
agreement to federal labor, not antitrust, law.48  
These three cases outlined the boundaries of the non-statutory labor  
exemption. All three involved competing employers contending that  
collectively bargained for agreements did not fall under the non-statutory labor 
exemption.49  However, employees also can sue employers alleging that terms 
in collective bargaining agreements do not fall within the non-statutory labor 
exemption, something that has mainly occurred in the context of professional 
sports.50  
B. Antitrust Challenges Initiated by Employees 
In a case that eventually weighed heavily in the Clarett litigation—Mackey 
v. National Football League—NFL players contended that a league rule  
granting the Commissioner exclusive power to compensate teams that lost a 
 
43. United Mine Workers, 381 U.S. at 665-66, 668-69. (“One group of employers may not conspire to 
eliminate competitors from the industry and the union is liable with the employers if it becomes a party to the 
conspiracy.”). 
44. Id. at 668 (finding that the agreement at issue had as its “purpose and effect . . . to establish wages at 
a level that marginal producers could not pay so that they would be driven from the industry.”). 
45. Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen, 381 U.S. at 679-80, 688. 
46. Id. at 681. 
47. Id. at 688. 
48. Id. at 689-90. 
49. See id. at 680; United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 660-61 (1965); Allen Bradley Co. 
v. Local Union No. 3, In’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 325 U.S. 797, 798 (1945). 
50. See Phillip J. Closius, Not at the Behest of Nonlabor Groups: A Revised Prognosis for a Maturing 
Sports Industry, 24 B.C. L. REV. 341, 348 n.34 and accompanying text (1983). 
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player to free agency violated the Sherman Act.51  There, the court evaluated 
this claim using a three-part test that combined important aspects of the Jewel 
Tea and Pennington decisions.  The exception would apply when: 
• “[T]he restraint on trade primarily affects only the parties to the 
collective bargaining relationship,”52 
• “[T]he agreement sought to be exempted concerns a mandatory 
subject of collective bargaining,”53 and 
• “[T]he agreement sought to be exempted is the product of bona 
fide arm’s-length bargaining.”54 
Ultimately, the exemption did not apply to the contested rule because it did 
not arise from “bona fide arm’s-length bargaining.”55 
Twenty years after Mackey, the Supreme Court decided another  
non-statutory labor exemption case that involved professional football—Brown 
v. Pro Football, Inc.56  In Brown, the plaintiff challenged a salary scale for  
practice team players that the NFL unilaterally imposed after negotiations  
between the NFL and NFLPA collapsed.57  Although never citing Mackey, the 
Court ultimately upheld the NFL’s policy, writing that the unilateral imposition 
of the salary scale “took place during and immediately after a  
collective-bargaining negotiation.  It grew out of, and was directly related to, 
the lawful operation of the bargaining process.  It involved a matter that the 
parties were required to negotiate collectively.  And it concerned only the parties 
to the collective-bargaining relationship.”58  
As one commentator pointed out, the test applied by the Supreme Court in 
Brown “appears to mirror the three-part Mackey test.”59  Thus, the Brown 
 
51. See Mackey v. Nat’l Football League, 543 F.2d 606, 609 (8th Cir. 1976). 
52. Id. at 614 (citing Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616 
(1975)). 
53. Id. (citing Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen, 381 U.S. 676; United Mine Workers, 381 
U.S. 657).   
54. Id. (citing Smith v. Pro-Football, 542 F. Supp. 462 (D.D.C. 1976); Phila. World Hockey Club, Inc. v. 
Phila. Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462, 496-500 (E.D. Pa. 1972)).  Note that mandatory subjects of 
collective bargaining include, for example, “wages, hours, and other conditions of employment.” Clarett, 306 
F. Supp. 2d at 393.  
55. See Mackey, 543 F.2d at 615-16. 
56. 518 U.S. 231 (1996). 
57. Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 234-35 (1996). 
58. Id. at 250. 
59. Closius, supra note 34, at 499-500. 
The first two sentences quoted refer to the term being a product of good faith bargaining. 
The final two sentences incorporate the mandatory subject of bargaining and the aspect of 
only affecting parties to the relationship prongs of the Mackey test. The Brown decision 
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decision suggested that the Mackey test, or at least some variant of the Mackey 
test, guided the Supreme Court when it evaluated the applicability of the  
non-statutory labor exemption to employee-employer agreements in  
professional football.60  Therefore, one would reasonably expect that the 
Mackey test would determine the applicability of the non-statutory labor  
exemption in Clarett’s case. 
III. COMPETING TESTS FOR THE APPLICABILITY OF THE NON-STATUTORY 
LABOR EXEMPTION 
In his challenge to the NFL’s three-year rule, Maurice Clarett made  
numerous arguments as to why the non-statutory labor exemption should not 
apply to the NFL’s three-year rule under the reasonable expectation that Mackey 
would apply in his case.61  Explicitly relying on the Mackey test in his argument 
to the court, Clarett contended that the three-year rule would escape antitrust 
scrutiny only if: “(1) the [three-year rule] is the product of bona fide arm’s 
length bargaining; (2) the agreement concerns a mandatory subject of collective 
bargaining; and (3) the restraint on trade affects only the parties to the collective 
bargaining relationship.”62  Though the Mackey test required Clarett to  
demonstrate only that the three-year rule failed to satisfy one of the three prongs, 
he contended that the rule failed on all three accounts.63 
First, Clarett argued that the NFL three-year rule did not result from  
arm’s-length collective bargaining because the rule did not arise from “actual 
bargaining but is, instead, merely the continuation of a rule unilaterally  
promulgated by the [NFL] some fifteen years before the NFLPA came into  
existence as the players’ collective bargaining representative.”64  Furthermore, 
Clarett argued that the CBA did not contain the rule, the rule was not  
incorporated by reference into the CBA, and the NFL did not demonstrate that 
any “actual bargaining” occurred between the parties as required by Mackey.65 
 
therefore expands the duration of the exemption and appears to support Mackey as the test 
for the exemption’s applicability. 
Id. 
60. Id. at 500. 
61. Plaintiff Maurice Clarett’s Memorandum of Law in Support of His Motion for Summary Judgment 
at 11-29, Clarett v. Nat’l Football League, 306 F. Supp. 2d 379 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (No. 1:03CV07441), 2003 
WL 26053422 [hereinafter Clarett’s Motion for Summary Judgment]. 
62. Id. at 23. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. at 26. 
65. Id. at 23-24. 
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Clarett then argued that the three-year rule was not a mandatory subject of 
collective bargaining because it did “not concern wages, hours, or other terms 
and conditions of employment of players currently employed by NFL teams.”66  
Finally, Clarett argued that he was not a party to the collective bargaining  
relationship because prospective players “are complete strangers to the  
NFL-NFLPA collective bargaining relationship.”67 
The Second Circuit had not adopted a test for when the non-statutory labor 
exemption should apply, so the district court looked to the Sixth, Eighth, and 
Ninth Circuits—which had explicitly adopted the three-pronged Mackey test—
for guidance when considering Clarett’s argument.68  Judge Schiendlin noted 
that, although the Second Circuit “acknowledged” the Mackey test, it “preferred 
to apply the simple formulation enunciated by the Supreme Court in Local  
Union No. 189 v. Jewel Tea Co.”69  Despite the Second Circuit’s preference for 
Jewel Tea’s formulation, Judge Schiendlin’s ultimate analysis relied on and  
incorporated the three-prongs of the Mackey test rather than the simpler, but 
vaguer, Jewel Tea test.70 
After Judge Schiendlin made the crucial decision to apply the Mackey test, 
Clarett’s arguments proved persuasive—the court found that the non-statutory 
labor exemption did not cover the three-year rule for all three of the reasons that 
Clarett argued.71  First, the court rejected the NFL’s argument that the rule  
addressed a “mandatory subject of collective bargaining.”72  The court noted 
that the Second Circuit cases the NFL cited to support their argument involved 
professional sports league provisions affecting drafted players, whereas the 
three-year rule dealt with eligibility for the draft.73  Second, the court found that 
Clarett was not a party to the collective bargaining unit because the three-year 
rule made Clarett ineligible for employment.74  Rebuffing the NFL’s stance, 
Judge Schiendlin wrote that “[t]hose who are categorically denied eligibility for 
 
66. Clarett’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 61, at 26-27. 
67. Id. at 29. 
68. Clarett, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 391. 
69. Id. at 392. 
70. Id. at 393-97. 
71. Id. at 391-97. 
72. Id. at 393 (“Nowhere is there a reference to wages, hours, or conditions of employment.  Indeed, the 
Rule makes a class of potential players unemployable.  Wages, hours, or working conditions affect only those 
who are employed or eligible for employment.”). 
73. Id. at 395 (“[N]one of the cases cited by the NFL involve job eligibility.  The league provisions  
addressed in Wood, Williams, and Caldwell govern the terms by which those who are drafted are employed.  
The Rule, on the other hand, precludes players from entering the labor market  
altogether . . . .”). 
74. Id. at 395-96. 
STRAUSER COMMENT 29.1 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/7/18  3:07 PM 
2018]    RECONSIDERING CLARETT AND PLAYER ACCESS  257 
employment, even temporarily, cannot be bound by the terms of employment 
they cannot obtain.”75  Finally, despite a lack of evidence from Clarett regarding 
the arms-length bargaining prong, Judge Schiendlin held that the three-year rule 
did not satisfy this requirement because the NFL did not demonstrate that the 
rule emerged from arms-length bargaining between the NFLPA and the NFL.76 
After holding that the non-statutory labor exemption applied, Judge 
Schiendlin ruled that the three-year rule was “[a] naked restraint on competition 
for player services because it excludes a class of players from entering the  
market.”77  Thus, because the three-year rule violated federal antitrust law, 
Judge Schiendlin granted Clarett summary judgment and ordered him eligible 
for the 2004 draft.78  
Hoping to prevent Clarett from entering the draft, the NFL swiftly appealed 
Judge Schiendlin’s decision.79  On appeal, Clarett’s case sat in front of the  
Second Circuit—a circuit that adopted a decidedly lower standard for deciding 
when to apply the non-statutory labor exemption as compared to the approach 
adopted by the Eighth Circuit.80  Moreover, whereas Judge Schiendlin adopted 
the Mackey test, the Second Circuit’s preference for Jewel Tea led future Justice 
Sotomayor to reject the district court’s invitation to follow Mackey.81  Indeed, 
the court found little value in the Mackey court’s assumption that “Connell, 
Jewel Tea, Pennington, and Allen Bradley dictate the appropriate boundaries of 
the non-statutory exemption,” writing that “these decisions are of limited  
assistance in determining whether an athlete can challenge restraints on the  
market for professional sports players imposed through a collective bargaining 
process.”82  Instead, the court applied an analysis derived from three Second 
Circuit cases that dealt with plaintiffs alleging that a professional sports league 
placed “a restraint upon a unionized labor market characterized by a collective 
bargaining relationship with a multi-employer bargaining unit.”83  Thus, the 
 
75. Id. at 396. 
76. Id. at 397 (“While Clarett offers no evidence on the issue of arm’s-length bargaining, he certainly 
highlights the NFL’s absence of proof.”). 
77. Id. at 398. 
78. Id. at 410-11. 
79. Associated Press, NFL Plans to Appeal Ruling, ESPN (Feb. 6, 2004), 
http://www.espn.com/nfl/news/story?id=1727856.   
80. See Scott A. Freedman, Comment, An End Run Around Antitrust Law: The Second Circuit’s Blanket 
Application of the Non-Statutory Labor Exemption in Clarett v. NFL, 45 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 155, 195-96 
(2004). 
81. See Clarett v. Nat’l Football League, 369 F.3d 124, 133 (2d Cir. 2004) (“We . . . have never regarded 
the Eighth Circuit’s test in Mackey as defining the appropriate limits of the non-statutory exemption.”). 
82. Id. at 133-34. 
83. Id. at 134. 
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existence of a collective bargaining relationship became the focal point of the 
analysis.84 
The three cases on which the court relied—Caldwell v. American Basketball 
Association,85 National Basketball Association v. Williams,86 and Wood v.  
National Basketball Association87—all involved claims that a professional 
sports league “imposed a restraint upon the labor market” in violation of  
antitrust law.88  The plaintiffs lost in each case because the Second Circuit found 
that the non-statutory labor exemption applied.89  The court based its analysis in 
Caldwell, Williams, and Wood “in the observation that the relationships among 
the defendant sports leagues and their players were governed by collective  
bargaining agreements and thus were subject to the carefully structured regime 
established by federal labor laws.”90  Per the court’s analysis, a reliance on  
antitrust law, rather than labor law, would risk undermining federal labor law.91 
In addition to its heavy reliance on the Second Circuit’s precedent in  
Caldwell, Williams, and Wood, the court also found support for rejecting the 
Mackey test in Brown v. Pro Football, Inc.92  In Brown, professional football 
players challenged the NFL’s unilaterally imposed cap on salaries for  
developmental players that the league created after a deadlock in negotiations 
between the league and the union.93  To prevent antitrust law from  
commandeering labor law’s role in policing the collective bargaining process, 
the Second Circuit read Brown to stand for the principle “that the non-statutory 
exemption precludes antitrust claims against a professional sports league for 
unilaterally setting policy with respect to mandatory bargaining subjects after 
negotiations with the players union over those subjects reach impasse.”94  The 
 
84. Id. 
85. 66 F.3d 523 (2d Cir. 1995). 
86. 45 F.3d 684 (2d Cir. 1995). 
87. 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987). 
88. Clarett, 369 F.3d at 134-35 (“Our decisions in Caldwell, Williams, and Wood all involved players’ 
claims that the concerted action of a professional sports league imposed a restraint upon the labor market for 
players’ services and thus violated antitrust laws.”). 
89. Id. at 135 (“In each case . . . we held that the non-statutory labor exemption defeated the players’ 
claims.”). 
90. Id. 
91. See id. (“[T]o permit antitrust suits against sports leagues on the ground that their concerted action 
imposed a restraint upon the labor market would seriously undermine many of the policies embodied by these 
labor laws.”). 
92. 518 U.S. 231 (1996). 
93. Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. at 234-35. 
94. Clarett, 369 F.3d at 137 (citing Brown, 518 U.S. at 240-42). 
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Second Circuit felt that Brown’s holding justified using Caldwell, Williams, and 
Wood as “controlling authority” in Clarett.95 
With its focus turned squarely to the nature of the bargaining relationship 
between the NFL and its players, the court found multiple reasons why the  
existence of a collective bargaining relationship between the NFL and the 
NFLPA precluded Clarett from successfully challenging the three-year rule on 
antitrust grounds.96 
First, the court held that the NFLPA and NFL exclusively controlled “the 
terms and conditions” of Clarett’s employment, including when Clarett became 
eligible for the draft.97  Indeed, if Clarett attempted to individually negotiate 
with an NFL franchise, he would “commit an unfair labor practice” since “the 
NFL players have unionized and have selected the NFLPA as its exclusive  
bargaining representative.”98  According to the court, as Clarett’s exclusive  
bargaining representative, the NFLPA cannot only create, but also restrict, the 
rights of players.99  Thus, the NFLPA could curtail Clarett’s right to enter the 
draft at the time he desired because the NFLPA can “favor veteran players over 
rookies.”100  Ultimately, because the NFLPA represented Clarett, the union,  
rather than Clarett personally, bore the responsibility of challenging what  
Clarett perceived as an unfair league policy.101 
The court also rejected Clarett’s argument that the eligibility rules were not 
mandatory bargaining subjects.102  The court held that certain “arrangements” 
in professional sports that do not appear, at least on their face, to affect  
mandatory bargaining subjects like wages or working conditions, still qualify as 
mandatory bargaining subjects “because they have tangible effects on the wages 
and working conditions of current NFL players.”103  Here, the court held that, 
 
95. Clarett, 369 F.3d at 138 (“Because we find that our prior decisions in this area fully comport—in 
approach and result—with the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown, we regard them as controlling authority.”). 
96. Id. at 138-43. 
97. Id. at 138-39 (“The terms and conditions of Clarett’s employment are . . . committed to the collective 
bargaining table and are reserved to the NFL and the players union’s selected representative to negotiate.”). 
98. Id. 
99. Id. at 139 (“The players union’s representative possesses ‘powers comparable to those possessed by 
a legislative body both to create and restrict the rights of those whom it represents.’” (internal citations  
omitted)). 
100. Id. 
101. Id. at 138-39. 
102. Id. at 139 (“[W]e find that the eligibility rules are mandatory bargaining subjects.”). 
103. Id. at 140. 
Because the unusual economic imperatives of professional sports raise ‘numerous problems 
with little or no precedent in standard industrial relations,’ we have recognized that many 
of the arrangements in professional sports that, at first glance, might not appear to deal with 
wages or working conditions are indeed mandatory bargaining subjects. 
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when viewed as part of the NFL’s overall compensation scheme, the contested 
age-eligibility rule was a mandatory bargaining subject because the restraint on 
new players entering the labor pool affected the salaries of current players due, 
in part, to “the complex scheme by which individual salaries in the NFL are 
set.”104  The court bolstered its holding that the three-year rule was a mandatory 
bargaining subject by reasoning that reducing competition for a limited number 
of roster spots increased the job security of current players, which is a  
mandatory bargaining subject.105  
The court also dismissed Clarett’s argument that the NFLPA could not  
negotiate the three-year rule because it affected non-unionized players, like 
Clarett, holding that unions can bargain over employment requirements for  
prospective employees.106  Moreover, the court did not entertain Clarett’s  
complaint about the arbitrariness of the three-year rule, writing that Clarett did 
not differ from a worker who believes that he “has the skills to fill a job vacancy 
but does not possess the qualifications or meet the requisite criteria that have 
been set.”107 
Finally, the court rejected Clarett’s complaint that all the NFL franchises 
committed antitrust violations by agreeing to abide by the three-year rule,  
holding that the benefits of permitting “the NFL teams to act collectively as a 
multi-employer bargaining unit” served the goals of federal labor policy and did 
not violate antitrust law.108  Moreover, the court feared that the threat that  
Clarett’s challenge presented to the collective bargaining process would  
unacceptably disrupt federal labor law.109 
Therefore, the court held that the non-statutory labor exemption applied  
because the NFLPA represented Clarett, the union could negotiate about  
age-related employment eligibility rules for future employees, and the court’s 
 
 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
104. Id. at 140.  
[T]he complex scheme by which individual salaries in the NFL are set, which involves, 
inter alia, the NFL draft, salary caps, and free agency, was built around the longstanding 
restraint on the market for entering players imposed by the eligibility rules and the related 
expectations about the average career length of NFL players. 
Id.  
105. Id. (“Because the size of NFL teams is capped, the eligibility rules diminish a veteran player’s risk 
of being replaced by either a drafted rookie or a player who enters the draft, and though not drafted, is then 
hired as a rookie free agent.”). 
106. Id. at 141 (“As a permissible, mandatory subject of bargaining, the conditions under which a  
prospective player, like Clarett, will be considered for employment as an NFL player are for the union  
representative and the NFL to determine.”). 
107. Id. 
108. Id. at 141 (describing the benefits of the multi-employer bargaining unit structure). 
109. Id. at 142-43 (describing the potential disruptions to labor law that would arise from Clarett’s suit). 
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concern with destabilizing federal labor law militated against a pro-Clarett  
verdict.110  The court reversed the district court’s entry of summary judgment in 
favor of Clarett, making him ineligible for the 2004 NFL draft.111  The Supreme 
Court denied Clarett’s petition for a writ of certiorari, leaving the young running 
back without a place to play for the 2004 season.112 
IV. EVEN UNDER THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S TEST THE NON-STATUTORY LABOR 
EXEMPTION SHOULD NOT APPLY TO THE NFL’S THREE-YEAR RULE 
The Second Circuit’s decision in Clarett faced sharp criticism for a variety 
of reasons.113  Some commentators argued that the court erred by not applying 
the Mackey test,114 while others suggested creating an entirely new test for  
determining when to apply the non-statutory labor exemption.115  Others, like 
Clarett’s attorney, Alan C. Milstein, continue to argue that the NFL age  
eligibility rule is not a mandatory bargaining subject.116  Although these 
 
110. Id. at 138-43. 
111. Id. at 143. 
112. Battista, supra note 26. 
113. See, e.g., Closius, supra note 34, at 496 (“The failure to consider the relationship between the NFL 
and the NCAA constitutes [Clarett’s] biggest deficiency.”); Stephen O. Ayeni, Jr., Intentional Grounding: 
How the NCAA and NFL Have Engaged in Practices That Unreasonably Restrain the Football Player Labor 
Market, 41 NOVA L. REV. 265, 290-92 (2017) (arguing that the age eligibility rules did not constitute a  
mandatory bargaining subject).  But see, e.g., Ronald Terk Sia, Clarett v. National Football League: Defining 
the Non-Statutory Labor Exception to Antitrust Law as it Pertains to Restraints Primarily Focused in Labor 
Markets and Restraints Primarily Focused in Business Markets, 4 PIERCE L. REV. 155 (2005) (arguing that 
the Second Circuit decided Clarett correctly); Peter Altman, Stay Out for Three Years After High School Or 
Play in Canada - And for Good Reason: An Antitrust Look at Clarett v. National Football League, 70 BROOK. 
L. REV. 569, 572 (2005) (“[T]he NFL’s three-year rule qualifies as a reasonable restraint on trade and  
comports with the purpose of the Sherman Antitrust Act.”); Michael R. Lombardo, Losing Collegiate  
Eligibility: How Mike Williams & Maurice Clarett Lost Their Chance to Perform on College Athletics’  
Biggest Stage, 3 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 19, 49-52 (2005) (describing the benefits that 
accrue to players when forced to develop in college, rather than the NFL); Brando Simeo Starkey, The Veil of 
Fair Representation: Maurice Clarett v. The National Football League, 37 U. BALT. L.F. 17 (2006) (assuming 
the correctness of the Second Circuit’s decision in Clarett II while simultaneously proposing a new  
ability-based framework for determining NFL eligibility). 
114. See, e.g., Walter T. Champion, Jr., Looking Back to Mackey v. NFL to Revive the Non-Statutory 
Labor Exemption in Professional Sports, 18 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 85 (2008). 
115. See, e.g., Eleanor M. Hynes, Unnecessary Roughness: Clarett v. NFL Blitzes the College Draft and 
Exemplifies Why Antitrust Law Is Also ‘A Game of Inches’, 19 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENTARY 577, 635 
(2005) (proposing that trial courts follow “the rule of reason approach”); Christian Dennie, From Clarett to 
Mayo: The Antitrust Labor Exemption Argument Continues, 8 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 63 (2007) 
 (proposing a modified Mackey test for evaluating whether the non-statutory labor exemption applies). 
116. Milstein, supra note 7.  Milstein argues that the NFL’s three-year rule fails to satisfy any prong of 
the three-part Mackey test.  He focuses significant attention on why the age eligibility rule is not a  
mandatory bargaining subject, but merely mentions that the NFLPA did not represent Clarett.  This Comment 
differs from Milstein’s argument in two ways: (1) it devotes significant attention to explaining why the 
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arguments offer persuasive critiques of the Second Circuit’s opinion in Clarett, 
this Comment adopts a different approach to explain why the non-statutory  
labor exemption should not apply to the NFL three-year rule. 
Unlike other critiques, this Comment neither proposes a new rule for  
analyzing when the non-statutory labor exemption should apply, nor offers a 
new interpretation of what constitutes a mandatory bargaining subject.  Rather, 
as mentioned above, this Comment argues that, even under the Second Circuit’s 
non-statutory labor exemption test, the NFL’s three-year rule should face  
federal antitrust scrutiny.  For the exemption to apply under the Second Circuit’s 
test, the three-year rule must result from the collective bargaining process  
between the affected parties.117  The Second Circuit ruling reflected a flawed 
understanding of the relationship between prospective professional football 
players and the NFLPA because it found that the NFLPA represents future NFL 
players.  
However, the NFLPA does not represent college football players; therefore, 
college football players and the NFL did not bargain for the three-year rule  
because prospective players are not part of the bargaining unit that negotiated 
the NFL CBA.  Thus, even if one concedes both that the Second Circuit applied 
the right test for the determining the applicability of the non-statutory labor  
exemption in Clarett and that age-related draft eligibility rules are mandatory 
bargaining subjects, the non-statutory labor exemption should still not apply and 
courts should subject the three-year rule to federal antitrust law. 
The remainder of Part IV explains why the non-statutory labor exemption 
should not apply to the NFL three-year rule.  First, this Part will explain the 
ways that the union relationships described in Caldwell, Williams, and Wood 
differ from the relationship between college football players and the NFLPA, 
ultimately concluding that college football players do not constitute part of the 
bargaining unit that negotiated the NFL CBA.  This Part will also consider the 
public policy reasons that problematize the continued acceptance of the NFL’s 
three-year rule.  Part V concludes with a proposed model for regulating player 
access to the NFL in the event that a court declares the NFL three-year rule an 




NFLPA did not represent Clarett, or any college football player, and (2) this Comment’s conclusion that the 
NFL three-year rule should face antitrust scrutiny does not depend on a court adopting the Mackey test. 
117. See Clarett v. Nat’l Football League, 369 F.3d 124, 135 (2d Cir. 2004) (describing how Second 
Circuit precedent regarding the applicability of the non-statutory labor exemption in the professional sports 
context “was rooted in the observation that relationships among the defendant sports leagues and their players 
were governed by collective bargaining agreements.”). 
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A. The Relationship Between College Football Players and the NFLPA Differs 
from the Union Relationships in Caldwell, Williams, and Wood 
The Second Circuit’s Clarett opinion relies heavily on the court’s precedent 
in Caldwell, Williams, and Wood.118  Not only did the court use those cases to 
craft a test to determine when the non-statutory labor exemption applies, but it 
also held that the close fit between those cases and Clarett’s made them ideal 
guides to determine the outcome in Clarett’s suit.119  However, even if Caldwell, 
Williams, and Wood delineate the proper test for the applicability of the  
non-statutory labor exemption, the significant differences between the players 
and unions in those cases and Clarett and the NFLPA in his case undermine the 
court’s claim that the outcomes in those cases guide the outcome in Clarett’s 
case.120  
First, unlike the plaintiff players in Caldwell, Williams, and Wood, Clarett 
had not played in his sports top professional league.121 In Wood, the plaintiff 
challenged the NBA’s draft and salary cap rules after a team in the league 
drafted him.122  In Williams, a class of current NBA players once again  
challenged the NBA draft and salary cap rules.123  In Caldwell, a former player 
in the American Basketball Association (ABA), alleged that teams in the league 
conspired among themselves to get him fired from his job and  
permanently blacklisted by the ABA’s member teams.124  Unlike the plaintiffs 
in these cases, no professional team ever employed Clarett—in fact, he brought 
his suit precisely because the NFL three-year rule denied him that  
opportunity.125 
Despite the glaring differences between Williams, Caldwell, and Woods and 
Clarett’s case, the court’s opinion makes no effort to explain how the NFLPA 
represented Clarett despite his inability to enter the NFL and earn direct 
 
118. Id. at 134-35. 
119. Id. at 135 (“We need only retrace the path laid down by [Caldwell, Williams, and Wood] to reach 
the conclusion that Clarett’s antitrust claims must fail.”). 
120. Id. 
121. See Caldwell v. Am. Basketball Ass’n, 66 F.3d 523, 525-26 (2d Cir. 1995); Nat’l Basketball Ass’n 
v. Williams, 45 F.3d 684, 685-86 (2d Cir. 1995); Wood v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 809 F.2d 954, 956-58 (2d 
Cir. 1987). 
122. Wood, 809 F.2d at 956-58. 
123. Williams, 45 F.3d at 685-86. 
124. Caldwell, 66 F.3d at 525-26. 
125. Clarett’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 61, at 2 (“Clarett moves this Court for an Order 
entering summary judgment in his favor, finding the [NFL three-year rule] invalid as a matter of law and 
allowing Clarett to compete in the marketplace of professional football.”). 
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representation by the NFLPA.126  In an arguably fatal flaw in the Second  
Circuit’s analysis, the court unjustifiably assumed that the NFLPA represented 
prospective NFL players that remain ineligible for the NFL Draft and play in an 
entirely different league.127  This unsubstantiated assumption ultimately denied 
Clarett the opportunity to enter the 2004 NFL Draft.128 
Rather than reconciling the key differences in Clarett and existing circuit 
precedent, the court’s application of Caldwell, Williams, and Wood to Clarett 
began by highlighting the importance of the relationship between the NFL and 
the NFLPA.129  According to the court, “[b]ecause the NFL players have  
unionized and have selected the NFLPA as its exclusive bargaining  
representative,” labor law prevented Clarett from negotiating independently 
with any NFL team.130  Moreover, because the NFLPA represented Clarett, the 
union could restrict his rights, including his right to enter the NFL Draft.131   
Finally, the NFLPA could favor certain players over others, including “veteran 
players over rookies.”132  Yet, such reasoning does not hold up because Clarett 
was not a rookie, veteran, or any class of NFL player—indeed, he sued the NFL  
precisely because he could not join the class of players the NFLPA  
represented.133  It requires serious cognitive gymnastics to imagine how a union 
for NFL players can represent a college football player. 
Some commentators close the gap in the Second Circuit’s analysis and  
provide arguments to support the conclusion that the NFLPA represented  
Clarett.134  One commentary on the Clarett decision basically adopts the court’s 
stance, relying on labor law principles to deduce the NFLPA’s jurisdiction over 
Clarett.135  Another, more persuasive commentary by Michael Scheinkman 
 
126. Clarett v. Nat’l Football League, 369 F.3d 124, 138 (2d Cir. 2004) (“Because we find that our prior 
decisions in this area fully comport—in approach and result—with the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown, 
we regard them as controlling authority.”). 
127. Id. at 138-39. 
128. Id. at 138-39, 143. 
129. Id. at 138-39. 
130. Id. at 138. 
131. Id. at 139. 
132. Id. 
133. Id. at 126; Clarett’s Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 61, at 2. 
134. See, e.g., Michael Scheinkman, Running Out of Bounds: Over-Extending the Labor Antitrust  
Exemption in Clarett v. National Football League, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 733, 757-58 (2005); Shauna Itri, 
Maurice Clarett v. National Football League, Inc.: An Analysis of Clarett’s Challenge to the Legality of the 
NFL’s Draft Eligibility Rule under Antitrust Law, 11 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 303, 333 (2004) (arguing that 
the Second Circuit’s holding that the NFLPA represented Clarett aligns with federal labor policy). 
135. See Itri, supra note 134, at 331-33.  Itri supports her proposition that “[c]ollective agreements . . . 
often affect employees outside of the bargaining union” by citing Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 
379 U.S. 203, 210-217 (1964), a case that held that a company must bargain with union members about its 
STRAUSER COMMENT 29.1 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/7/18  3:07 PM 
2018]    RECONSIDERING CLARETT AND PLAYER ACCESS  265 
argued that the NFLPA represented Clarett by relying on Wood and a D.C.  
District Court case, Zimmerman v. National Football League.136  Scheinkman’s 
analysis of Wood focused on that case’s holding that “collective bargaining 
agreements may be exempt from antitrust scrutiny although they may adversely 
affect prospective employees.”137  Scheinkman’s analysis of Zimmerman  
explained that the non-statutory labor exemption applied to a supplemental draft 
agreed to by the NFL and NFLPA because “potential future players are parties 
to the collective bargaining relationship because the agreement binds all  
employees who subsequently enter the bargaining unit.”138 
Yet, the collective bargaining relationships that existed between the  
plaintiffs and unions in Wood and Zimmerman differed substantially from the 
relationship that existed between Clarett and the NFLPA.  As mentioned above, 
in Wood, the plaintiff challenged NBA salary cap and draft rules to which the 
league and NBA players’ union agreed before a team drafted Wood.139   
However, unlike Clarett, Wood stepped into the shoes of the  
professional basketball players that the NBA players’ union represented when 
it negotiated the contested salary cap and draft rules.140  The professional  
basketball players’ union negotiated different employment terms for veterans 
and rookies, but all individuals bound by the agreement played in the NBA.141  
This differs from the NFLPA because, according to the court’s analysis in  
Clarett, the NFLPA represented veterans, rookies, and college players, even 
while precluding the college players that it supposedly represents from entering 
the NFL.142  
In other words, Wood entered the bargaining unit represented by the  
professional basketball players union before the court bound him to the union’s 
negotiated rules.143  By contrast, the court bound Clarett to the NFLPA and 
NFL’s negotiated terms even though he could not join the bargaining unit—
NFL players—that the NFLPA represented.144  Thus, unlike Wood, Clarett did 
not merely face a lower salary that favored more senior employees in the  
 
decision to “contract out” labor previously performed by the union.  Presumably, Itri finds support for her 
proposition because the union agreement affected the non-union contractor. 
136. See Scheinkman, supra note 134, at 757-58. 
137. Id. at 758. 
138. Id. 
139. Wood v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 809 F.2d 954, 956-58 (2d Cir. 1987). 
140. Id. at 958 (describing a professional basketball team drafting, negotiating with, and signing Wood). 
141. Id. at 957-58 (describing parameters of the CBA). 
142. Clarett v. Nat’l Football League, 369 F.3d 124, 138-39 (2d Cir. 2004).  
143. Wood, 809 F.2d at 960-61 (outlining Wood’s complaint regarding the amount of salary earned once 
he became a professional basketball player; not his ability to earn a salary).  
144. Clarett, 369 F.3d at 138-39, 143. 
STRAUSER COMMENT 29.1 (DO NOT DELETE) 12/7/18  3:07 PM 
266 MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 29:1 
bargaining unit; Clarett received no salary because the union that supposedly 
represented his interests excluded him, and others like him, from the bargaining 
unit altogether.145 
The union relationship with the plaintiff in Zimmerman differs from  
Clarett’s relationship with the NFLPA, too.  Zimmerman argued that the NFL’s 
supplemental draft violated antitrust law because it only allowed him to  
negotiate with one NFL team once drafted.146  The NFLPA and the NFL  
negotiated and agreed to the supplemental draft,147 but Zimmerman argued that 
the NFLPA did not represent him because he played in another professional 
football league—the United States Football League (USFL).148  There, the court 
held that the bargaining unit included Zimmerman “[a]s a potential NFL 
player.”149 
Unlike the three-year rule that Clarett challenged, the rule Zimmerman  
challenged became applicable only once he became a party to the bargaining 
unit represented by the NFLPA—NFL football players.150  Nothing prevented 
Zimmerman from joining the bargaining unit that consisted of NFL players and 
their union representatives, but once he joined that unit the court held him to the 
terms that the unit’s representatives negotiated with the NFL franchises.151   
Conversely, the Second Circuit forced Clarett to abide by terms that the NFLPA 
negotiated even though he did not and could not play in the NFL and join the 
bargaining unit represented by the NFLPA.152  In other words, the NFLPA  
represented Zimmerman because once he became an NFL player, or at least had 
the opportunity to become one after a team drafted him, he came under the  
purview of the negotiated terms of the CBA.153  This differs from the situation 
in Clarett, where the court should have found that the NFLPA did not represent 
Clarett because he never received the opportunity to become an NFL player, 
 
145. Compare Wood, 809 F.2d at 960, with Clarett, 369 F.3d at 141, 143 (Wood complains because the 
draft and salary cap “assign him to work for a particular employer at a diminished wage,” whereas Clarett 
cannot even enter the NFL). 
146. Zimmerman v. Nat’l Football League, 632 F. Supp. 398, 401 (D.D.C. 1986) (“Zimmerman charges 
that the supplemental draft violates section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982), because it allows him 
to negotiate with only a single NFL team.”). 
147. Id. at 401-02. 
148. Id. at 400, 405 (“[The supplemental draft] affected players already under contract to professional 
football leagues other than the NFL.”). 
149. Id. at 405-06. 
150. Id. at 402 (discussing how Zimmerman is only subject to NFL CBA rules after the Giants, an NFL 
team, drafted him). 
151. Id. at 405-06 (citing Wood for the proposition that the terms of a CBA apply to players who enter 
the bargaining unit after the parties to the agreement already agreed to the CBA’s terms). 
152. Clarett v. Nat’l Football League, 369 F.3d 124, 138-43 (2d Cir. 2004).  
153. Zimmerman, 632 F. Supp. at 405-06. 
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and, therefore, the terms and conditions the NFLPA negotiated on behalf of NFL 
players should not apply to him. 
B. College Football Players Did Not Constitute Part of the Bargaining Unit 
That Negotiated the NFL CBA  
Not only does the court’s opinion in Clarett misapply the relevant case law 
regarding the application of the non-statutory labor exemption in professional 
sports, but it also interprets the relationship between the NFLPA and Clarett in 
a way that directly contradicts the defined contours of the bargaining unit as 
explicitly outlined by the NFL Management Council (NFLMC) and the NFLPA 
in the CBA.154  In the preamble to that agreement, the CBA describes the 
NFLPA as: 
[T]he sole and exclusive bargaining representative of present and future  
employee players in the NFL in a bargaining unit described as follows: 
• All professional football players employed by a member club 
of the National Football League; 
• All professional football players who have been previously  
employed by a member club of the National Football League 
who are seeking employment with an NFL Club; 
• All rookie players once they are selected in the current year’s 
NFL College Draft; and 
• All undrafted rookie players once they commence negotiation 
with an NFL Club concerning employment as a player.155 
As clearly articulated by the NFLMC and the NFLPA in the CBA, players 
do not become members of the bargaining unit that negotiated the CBA until an 
NFL team drafts them or they begin negotiating with an NFL team about signing 
as a player.156  Clarett never received that opportunity because the three-year 
rule prevented him from pursuing the opportunity to play in the NFL.157  Thus, 
 
154. See Collective Bargaining Agreement Between National Football League and National Football 
League Players Association (1993-2000), at 1 [hereinafter 1993 CBA].  The CBA that applied in 2004 during 
Clarett’s case was an extension of the 1993 CBA.  See generally Kevin G. Quinn, Getting to the 2011-2020  
National Football League Collective Bargaining Agreement, 7 INT’L J. SPORT FIN. 141, 146 (2012). 
155. 1993 CBA, supra note 154, at 3 (emphasis added).  The current CBA uses the exact same language 
to describe the bargaining unit.  See 2011 CBA, supra note 10, at XV. 
156. 1993 CBA, supra note 154. 
157. Clarett, 369 F.3d at 143.  
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even though the NFLPA did not intend to represent Clarett,158 the Second  
Circuit proclaimed that the NFLPA did with virtually no support.159 
Recent events provide further evidence that the NFLPA does not represent 
college players.  In 2014, Northwestern football players petitioned the National 
Labor Relations Board for permission to unionize.160  The NFLPA backed the 
Northwestern players’ petition to unionize, saying, “[T]he NFLPA pledges its 
support to the National Collegiate Players Association (NCPA) and its pursuit 
of basic rights and protections for future NFLPA members.”161  Indeed, the 
NFLPA, along with the unions representing professional baseball, hockey,  
soccer, and basketball players, filed an amicus curiae brief that supported the 
proposed union.162  If the NFLPA actually represented college players, it would 
not advocate for the creation of a rival union to represent college players  
because that would diminish the NFLPA’s power as a union by diminishing the 
number of players that the NFLPA represents. 
Additionally, the NFLPA constitution supports the conclusion that the  
union does not include college football players for four reasons.  First, the  
section on membership in the NFLPA Constitution outlines detailed  
membership qualifications for current and former NFL players, but it never 
mentions potential NFL players currently in college.163  The next section of the 
NFLPA constitution, which says “[t]here shall be a Player Representative and 
two Co-Alternate Player Representatives from each club,” makes no mention of 
representatives from the college football ranks.164  Moreover, the listed  
representatives for the NFLPA Board of Player Representatives exclusively 
contains current NFL players.165  Fourth, and finally, the NFLPA Constitution 
 
158. 1993 CBA, supra note 154. 
159. Clarett, 369 F.3d at 138-39. 
160. See Tom Farrey, Northwestern Wildcats Football Players Trying to Join Labor Union, ESPN (Jan. 
28, 2014), http://www.espn.com/espn/otl/story/_/id/10363430/outside-lines-northwestern-wildcats-football-
players-trying-join-labor-union. 
161. Mike Florio, NFLPA Backs Efforts of College Players to Unionize, PROFOOTBALLTALK (Jan. 28, 
2014), http://profootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2014/01/28/nflpa-backs-efforts-of-college-players-to-unionize/ 
(emphasis added). 
162. See Amicus Curia Brief of Major League Baseball Players’ Association, National Hockey Players 
Union, Major League Soccer Players Union, National Football League Players Association, and National 
Basketball Players Association in Support of Petitioner College Athletes Players Association, Northwestern 
Univ. & Coll. Athletes Players Ass’n, 362 N.L.R.B. 167 (2015) (No. 13-RC-121359) [hereinafter Professional 
Sports Unions Amicus Brief]. 
163. See NFLPA, 2017 NFLPA CONSTITUTION art. II, at 5-9 (March 2017), available at 
https://nflpaweb.blob.core.windows.net/media/Default/PDFs/NFLPAConstitution2017.pdf. 
164. Id. art. 3.01, at 9. 
165. See NFLPA Officers, NFLPA, https://www.nflpa.com/about/nflpa-officers/board-of-player-reps 
(last visited Dec. 13, 2018). 
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provides for the creation of a “Former Players Board of Directors.”166   
Currently, eight former NFL players serve on the Former Player’s Board.167  
However, the NFLPA constitution makes no mention of representatives for  
college players. 
Thus, no evidence exists to show that the NFLPA represents college football 
players or that the bargaining unit that negotiated the CBA includes college 
football players.  Rather, all of the evidence suggests, both explicitly and  
implicitly, that college football players were not parties to the bargaining unit 
that negotiated the CBA and that the NFLPA does not represent college football 
players.  Therefore, even under the Second Circuit’s test for the application of 
the non-statutory labor exemption, the exemption should not apply to the NFL 
three-year rule. 
C. Policy Considerations Support the Abolition of the NFL’s Three-Year Rule 
In addition to these legal justifications for finding that the non-statutory  
labor exemption does not apply to the NFL three-year rule, policy  
considerations support the abolition of the age-eligibility rule.  The NFL asserts 
four policy rationales for the three-year rule: 
[P]rotecting younger and/or less experienced players—that is, 
players who are less mature physically and psychologically—
from heightened risks of injury in NFL games; protecting the 
NFL’s entertainment product from the adverse consequences 
associated with such injuries; protecting the NFL clubs from 
the costs and potential liability entailed by such injuries; and 
protecting from injury and self-abuse other adolescents who 
would over-train—and use steroids—in the misguided hope of 
developing prematurely the strength and speed required to play 
in the NFL.168 
These rationales appear valid at first glance, but further inspection reveals 
the serious shortcomings of the NFL’s policy justifications for the three-year 
rule. 
First, teenagers have already played in the NFL. For instance, “in 1964, 
NFL Commissioner Pete Rozelle permitted 19-year old running back Andy  
Livingston to sign with the Chicago Bears.”169  In 2007, the Houston Texans 
 
166. NFLPA, supra note 163, art. 2.11, at 7-9. 
167. See Former Player Board of Directors, NFLPA, https://www.nflpa.com/former-players/board-di-
rectory (last visited Dec. 13, 2018). 
168. Memorandum of the National Football League, supra note 18, at 4. 
169. Edelman & Wacker, supra note 11, at 347. 
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drafted nineteen-year-old Amobi Okoye without any protest from the NFL.170  
If the NFL genuinely cared about the risks that teenagers faced playing in the 
NFL, then neither Livingston nor Okoye should have played in the league at 
nineteen.  The fact that both did highlights that the NFL primarily cares about 
the continued enforcement of its arbitrary age-eligibility rule, not the risks that 
young players face upon entry into the NFL.  
Additionally, NFL teams do not need league rules to prevent them from 
drafting physically and psychologically immature players in the NFL draft  
because the highly competitive nature of the league incentivizes teams to select 
only players that player personnel executives believe will help the team win.  
The elimination of the age-eligibility rules would not mandate the selection of 
recent high school football graduates or college freshmen, it would merely  
introduce that possibility.  Presumably, the desire of NFL franchises to field 
competitive teams will serve as a check on unprepared and underdeveloped 
players entering the NFL. 
The NFL’s asserted concern about the risks of physical injury to  
underdeveloped players exaggerates the different risk levels between college 
football and the NFL.  In 2017, five college football players died either in  
offseason training or on the field in a game.171  In 2018, Jordan McNair, a  
nineteen-year-old football player at the University of Maryland, died while 
training for the season, causing a national uproar and, after significant delay, the 
firing of the team’s head coach, DJ Durkin.172 Moreover, regarding the  
high-profile concussion issue, recent lawsuits suggest that the NCAA faces as 
many, and potentially more, problems than the NFL for concussions that college 
football players suffer while playing.173  In fact, players face serious  
concussion-related risks in high school football, “where sustaining a concussion 
before another has healed kills or seriously injures about 10 players a year.”174  
Non-concussion legal activity further reveals the inherent dangers and  
potential for significant injury-related damage that college football players face.  
 
170. Thayer Evans, Fifth Down - Teenager Picked in First 10, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2007, https://ar-
chive.nytimes.com/query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage-9E07E1DD133EF93AA15757C0A9619C8B63.html. 
171. See Dennis Dodd, Saturday Was One of the Deadliest for College Football in Decades, CBS SPORTS 
(Sept. 20, 2017), https://www.cbssports.com/college-football/news/saturday-was-one-of-the-deadliest-for-
college-football-in-decades/. 
172. Adam Rittenberg & Tom VanHaaren, Maryland Terrapins Football Jordan McNair Death DJ 
Durkin Scandal Timeline, ESPN (Oct. 31, 2018), http://www.espn.com/college-foot-
ball/story/_/id/24351869/maryland-terrapins-football-jordan-mcnair-death-dj-durkin-scandal-line.   
173. See Rachel Axon, Does NCAA Face More Concussion Liability Than NFL?, USA TODAY, July 25, 
2013, https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaaf/2013/07/25/ncaa-concussion-lawsuit-adrian-arring-
ton/2588189/. 
174. Alan Schwarz, Before Reaching the N.F.L., High School and College Players Face Risk of Head 
Injuries, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/02/sports/football/02dementia.html. 
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In February 2018, a former Texas Christian University (TCU) football player 
Kolby Listenbee sued TCU, TCU Head Coach Gary Patterson, the Big 12  
Conference, and others alleging “that TCU and its staff were ‘malicious’ and 
‘grossly negligent’ in how they responded to him suffering a debilitating pelvic 
region injury.”175  Among the damages that Listenbee alleges that he suffered, 
he lists “‘losses in value and losses in profits, including, but not limited to NFL 
career earnings.”176  Undoubtedly the NFL enjoys transferring this legal risk to 
the NCAA, but transferring that risk does not mitigate the injury risk that college 
football players face.  In fact, it asks them to accept that risk without the salary 
that NFL players receive.  The NFL undoubtedly cares about “protecting the 
NFL’s entertainment product from the adverse consequences associated with” 
injuries like concussions; but disguising those concerns as anything more than 
a concern about the league’s public image and bottom-line requires more than 
an assertion by league lawyers that the three-year rule aims to protect young 
football players.177 
The NFL’s argument that the three-year rule prevents players from  
over-training in hopes of gaining early entry to the NFL also ignores the  
incentives that players face to earn college scholarships and to distinguish  
themselves early in their college career.  NFL draftees come from all levels of 
college football, but 77.2% of all first-round draft picks came from the so-called 
Power 5 conferences.178  Therefore, earning a scholarship to those schools, 
something that frequently occurs before players turn eighteen, creates similar 
incentives for over-training that earlier access to the NFL would create.  And 
even though players may not enter the NFL until three seasons have passed since 
their high school graduation, they know that their performance early in their 
collegiate career impacts their future attractiveness as a draft pick.179  Thus,  
allowing NFL teams to draft college players before three years have passed 
since their high school graduation does no more to incentivize over-training and 
steroid abuse than the existing draft structure. 
 
175. See Michael McCann, Kolby Listenbee Sues TCU Football: Breaking Down the Lawsuit, SPORTS 
ILLUSTRATED, Feb. 1, 2018, https://www.si.com/college-football/2018/02/01/kolby-listenbee-lawsuit-tcu-
gary-patterson-legal-analysis. 
176. Id. 
177. Memorandum of the National Football League, supra note 18, at 4. 
178. Daniel Wilco, College Football Teams and Conferences with the Most NFL Draft First-Round Picks, 
NCAA (Apr. 27, 2018), https://perma.cc/A6NK-8DLF.  The Power 5 Conferences are the SEC, Big 10, Big 
12, Pac 12, and ACC.  Id. 
179. SI Staff, NBA Draft: College Football Players Who Could Go One and Done to NFL, SPORTS 
ILLUSTRATED, June 16, 2017, https://www.si.com/college-football/2017/06/16/one-and-done-freshmen-nfl-
nba-draft (describing freshman college football players who NFL teams would likely draft if permitted to by 
NFL rules). 
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Finally, equitable principles highlight the need to allow college athletes—
who receive nothing more than a scholarship despite the significant revenue 
they generate for their universities, coaches, and administrators—to earn their 
true market value once they have the talent necessary for a professional 
league.180  Equating the positions of professional athletes and college football 
players defies logic and displays an ignorance of the realities of modern college 
athletics.  Indeed, recent studies highlight the inequity of a system that generates 
substantial revenue for all parties involved in college athletics, except the  
players on the field.181  Eliminating the age-eligibility requirement that prevents 
the most talented college players from reaping the rewards of their true market 
value takes a step toward creating a fairer system of compensation for  
revenue-generating football players. 
D. A Model for Player Access to the NFL After the Abolition of the NFL’s 
Three-Year Rule 
If a future court decides an antitrust challenge to the three-year rule 
properly—by striking down the policy as a violation of federal antitrust law—
the problem about how to properly protect the labor rights of potential NFL 
players would remain unresolved.  A number of potential solutions exist.  For 
instance, player representatives from each school could band together to form a 
union that mirrors the multi-employer bargaining unit, which the Clarett court 
approved.182  That union could represent the interests of college football players 
in negotiations between the NFLPA and the NFL over issues like draft  
eligibility. If selecting a representative from each school seems  
unwieldy, selecting a representative from each conference or region could prove 
workable, while still effectively allowing college football players to take  
collective action. 
 
180. See, e.g., Stephen A. Bergman & Trevon D. Logan, The Effect of Recruit Quality on College Team 
Performance, 17 J. SPORTS ECON. 578, 597 (2014) (estimating that a 5-star recruit generates more than 
$150,000 in bowl revenue for an individual school); Adam Rittenberg, SEC Generated $596.9M in Revenue 
in 2016-17, ESPN (Feb. 1, 2018), http://www.espn.com/college-sports/story/_/id/22288788/sec-generated-
5969-million-revenue-2016-17.  See generally Taylor Branch, The Shame of College Sports, ATLANTIC, Oct. 
2011, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/10/the-shame-of-college-sports/308643/  
(outlining the structure of college sports and making a case for paying college athletes). 
181. See, e.g., Marc Edelman, How Antitrust Law Could Reform College Football: Section 1 of the  
Sherman Act and the Hope for Tangible Change, 68 RUTGERS U.L. REV. 809, 810 (2016) (A speech that 
“discuss[es] how the absurdity came to pass where college football has become a multibillion dollar business, 
yet a majority of college football players live below the poverty line.”). 
182. Clarett v. Nat’l Football League, 369 F.3d 124, 136 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. 
Williams, 45 F.3d 684, 688-93 (2d Cir. 1995)) (“[M]ulti-employer bargaining units are a long-accepted and 
commonplace means of giving employers the tactical and practical advantages of collective action.”). 
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With the overturning of the Clarett decision, college football players could 
also potentially directly negotiate with NFL teams, something that the Second 
Circuit precluded in Clarett.183  Under such a scheme, NFL teams could  
purchase the rights to the current or future talents of college football players in 
exchange for a contractual obligation by that player that he play for that team 
when he enters the NFL. 
This system mirrors the system that the National Hockey League (NHL) 
uses.  In the NHL’s system, NHL teams can draft the rights to high school  
players who then can still attend college, with the caveat that the NHL team who 
drafted him retains the right to the player “until 30 days after he has left  
college.”184  The only difference between this Comment’s proposed system and 
the system hockey uses is that NFL teams would pay college football players 
salaries.  Altering the system in this way makes sense given the significant 
amount of money that college football generates,185 money that currently flows 
to everybody but the players that everyone tunes in to watch.186  Such a system 
will undoubtedly encounter resistance from the entrenched powers of the NFL 
and NCAA,187 but that pushback would offer the surest sign that professional 
football’s eligibility rules require an overhaul. 
 
183. Id. at 138 (“Because the NFL players have unionized and have selected the NFLPA as its exclusive 
bargaining representative, labor law prohibits Clarett from negotiating directly the terms and conditions of his 
employment with any NFL club.”). 
184. See Steven Goldstein, More NHL Prospects Are Electing to Play in College, CHI. TRIB., June 24, 
2015, http://www.chicagotribune.com/sports/hockey/blackhawks/ct-college-hockey-nhl-spt-0628-
20150623-story.html. 
185. See Marc Tracy & Tim Rohan, What Made College Football More Like the Pros? $7.3 Billion, for 
a Start, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/31/sports/ncaafootball/what-made-
college-ball-more-like-the-pros-73-billion-for-a-start.html. 
186. See Robert Brown, Research Note: Estimates of College Football Player Rents, 12 J. SPORTS ECON. 
200 (2010) (finding that “premium college football players contribute large rents to their schools.”). 
187. See Closius, supra note 34, at 496.  
Clarett was, in fact, wrongly decided in 2004.  The result it produced is even less defensible 
for the current NFL and NBA.  While the opinion saved college football and basketball, its 
legal reasoning is seriously flawed.  The failure to consider the relationship between the 
NFL and the NCAA constitutes its biggest deficiency.  The NFL eligibility rule is much 
more tha[n] a restraint on a class of prospective players.  The restraint supports the financial 
structure of college football and saves each NFL team millions of dollars in developmental 
costs.  This conspiracy inhibits entry-level competition in professional football and allows 
both the universities and the NFL to enjoy monopolistic profits at the expense of college 
football players.  The predatory effect of the NFL’s group boycott is even more pernicious 
when draft eligibility is denied to college players unquestionably ready to play in the NFL.  
Their ability to profit from their skills is delayed strictly to protect the financial interests of 
the NFL and the NCAA Division I universities.  
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The Second Circuit’s errant ruling in Clarett prevented Maurice Clarett, and 
other similarly situated players, from entering the NFL draft, foreclosing his 
pursuit of what the court called a “high-paying, high-profile career.”188  Not only 
did the foreclosure of such an opportunity prevent Clarett from capturing his 
full market value during the peak of his football career, but it also deprived him 
of the structure that a job in professional football provides. Unfortunately,  
devoid of this structure, Clarett, and players like him, often encounter problems 
that haunt them years after they play their final snap.189  In hopes of preventing 
future stories like Clarett’s, this Comment argued that, even under the Second 
Circuit’s test for the applicability of the non-statutory labor exemption, the 
NFL’s three-year rule does not qualify for protection from antitrust scrutiny  
because the NFLPA does not represent college players in CBA negotiations 
with the NFL.  A court that arrived at such a conclusion would take a step toward 
ending the current inequitable system that suppresses the compensation of  
college football players. 
 
188. Clarett, 369 F.3d at 141. 
189. See Associated Press, supra note 6; see also Jill Martin, Johnny Manziel Timeline, CNN (May 5, 
2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/02/22/us/johnny-manziel-timeline/index.html. 
